Iran's Nuclear Weapon Threat
Even if they came out and said it directly, it could not be more obvious. On Wednesday, June 8, Iran announced that it is planning to triple its production of enriched uranium nuclear fuel, now moving to an underground facility near the city of Qum. This declaration might on the surface seem benign; Iran has claimed to be peacefully pursuing nuclear power for several years now. However, with the move to the underground facility, the continued lack of compliance with IAEA inspectors, and Iran's drastic expansion of a nuclear program which has been condemned by the UN and America, it is clear that Iran is not simply pursuing nuclear power. In an already destabilized region, Iran is dangerously close to possessing the highly enriched uranium needed to create a nuclear weapon.
Anybody who has witnessed the Arab Spring revolts of late can see one of the many possible dangers of Iran possessing nuclear weapons. Even if the Iranian government has no intention of actually using the weapons, should there be a protest movement that destabilizes the government, as in Libya, Syria, Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt, the weapons could fall into the hands of a new, inexperienced government, or worse, radicals or terrorists.
When Libya first began to disintegrate, many breathed a sigh of relief that Gadhafi had given up his nuclear arsenal for monetary incentives in 2002; should he have retained them, the war in Libya would look completely different. First, NATO would never invade a nuclear nation which has sponsored terrorism in the past; it would only take one of Gadhafi's moments of insanity to see a nuclear explosion in New York, Paris, Rome, or another city. Secondly, internal revolts and resistance may not have been as strong and persistent if Gadhafi had been in control of nuclear warheads; while would be illogical for Gadhafi to use nuclear weapons against Benghazi, fear of that occurrence may have planted a seed in the minds of soldiers that prevented them from openly fighting Gadhafi's forces on the ground. Lastly, Gadhafi may have more support from the surrounding Arab nations should he have nuclear weapons, as a) they could be afraid of his destructive power, but b) they could support him if they see him as a new Nasser, an Arab with the power to strike fear into the West. Indeed, nothing makes friends like nuclear weapons.Continued on the next page