Reactions to story from The Washington Post

• 

  Kevin Phillips offers six parallels between declining empires

  http://judasnoose.wordpress.com/2008/06/29/kevin-phillips-of...
  25 days ago in JudasNoose · Authority: 8

  From Wash Post one can argue that imperial Spain, maritime Holland and industrial Britain shared a half-dozen vulnerabilities as they peaked and declined: a sense of things no longer being on the right track, intolerant or missionary religion, military or imperial overreach, economic polarization, the rise of finance (displacing industry) and excessive debt. So too for today’s United States. Before we amplify the contemporary U.S. parallels, the skeptic can point out how doomsayers in each nation, while eventually correct, were also premature. In Britain, for example, doubters fretted about becoming another Holland as early as the 1860s, and apprehension surged again in the 1890s, based on the industrial muscle of such rivals as Germany and the United States. By the 1940s, those predictions had come true, but in practical terms, the critics of the 1860s and 1890s were too early. Premature fears have also dogged the United States. The decades after the 1968 election were marked by waves of a new national apprehension: that U.S. post-World War II global hegemony was in danger. The first, in 1968-72, involved a toxic mix of global trade and currency crises and the breakdown of the U.S. foreign policy consensus over Southeast Asia. Books emerged with titles such as “Retreat From Empire?” and “The End of the American Era.” More national malaise followed Watergate and the fall of Saigon. Stage three came in the late 1980s, when a resurgent Japan seemed to be challenging U.S. preeminence in manufacturing and possibly even finance. In 1991, Democratic presidential aspirant Paul Tsongas observed that “the Cold War is over. . . . Germany and Japan won.” Well, not quite. In 2008, we can mark another perilous decade: the tech mania of 1997-2000, morphing into a bubble and market crash; the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; imperial hubris and the Bush administration’s bungled 2003 invasion of Iraq. These were followed by OPEC’s abandoning its $22-$28 price range for oil, with the cost per barrel rising over five years to more than $100; the collapse of global respect for the United States over the Iraq war; the imploding U.S. housing market and debt bubble; and the almost 50 percent decline of the U.S. dollar against the euro since 2002. Small wonder a global financial crisis is in the air. Here, then, is the unnerving possibility: that another, imminent global crisis could make the half-century between the 1970s and the 2020s the equivalent for the United States of what the half-century before 1950 was for Britain. This may well be the Big One: the multi-decade endgame of U.S. ascendancy. The chronology makes historical sense — four decades of premature jitters segueing into unhappy reality. Let’s just highlight the six: a sense of things no longer being on the right track, intolerant or missionary religion, military or imperial overreach, economic polarization, the rise of finance (displacing industry) excessive debt.
• 
  http://ulivovelletri.splinder.com/post/17359297
  49 days ago in ulivo velletri · Authority: 5

  I VECCHI TITANI SONO TUTTI CADUTI. I PROSSIMI SARANNO GLI USA? KEVIN PHILLIPS Washington Post Lo scorso agosto, nel bel mezzo del panico sui mutui, Alan Greenspan si premurò di rassicurare la gente ansiosa. Questo trambusto – disse il vecchio presidente della Federal Reserve Board – ricorda molto la breve crisi finanziaria del debito russo del 1998 o quella del mercato azionario statunitense del 1987. Non c’è da preoccuparsi. Ma in sottofondo si potevano udire gli scricchiolii e sentire le scosse provocate dalla collisione delle grandi placche tettoniche della politica e dell’economia. Nove mesi dopo, le fiacche analogie di Greenspan non incantano più. L’economia statunitense sta affrontando un livello di debito senza precedenti, mentre le merci rincarano e i prezzi degli immobili crollano, per non parlare dell’indebolimento del dollaro. Ultimamente l’economia sembra essersi assestata, ma nonostante ciò ci sono economisti che temono l’avverarsi della più grande crisi finanziaria mondiale da quella del 1930. Ma è un paragone che non calza; è quasi impossibile che si ripeta un filotto come quello della grande depressione, quando il mercato azionario sprofondò all’80 per cento, la disoccupazione salì al 25 per cento, e le grandi praterie divennero un’immensa raccolta di contadini del profondo sud che scappavano verso la California. Ma gli statunitensi dovrebbero preoccuparsi, perché la situazione attuale può preludere ad un capovolgimento globale che segnò le sorti di altre grandi potenze economiche, prima fra tutte la Gran Bretagna. Più dell’80% degli statunitensi riconoscono che siamo sulla strada sbagliata, ma molti, se non i più, ritengono che la storia di altri paesi sia irrilevante, che gli Stati Uniti sono unici, scelti da Dio. Ma così pensavano anche le altre grandi potenze economiche del passato, Roma, la Spagna, l’Olanda (durante i gloriosi giorni di conquiste marittime del XVII secolo, quando New York si chiamava New Amsterdam) e la Gran Bretagna del XIX secolo. La loro forza iniziale fu anche la loro debolezza finale, un po’ come sta andando agli Stati Uniti dal 1980. C’è un gran numero di libri scritti su queste illusioni iniziali e declini. Leggendoli, si può notare che la Spagna imperiale, l’Olanda marittima e la Gran Bretagna industriale condividevano mezza dozzina di vulnerabilità mentre raggiungevano la maggior gloria per poi inabissarsi: la sensazione di essere sulla strada sbagliata, una religione intollerante o missionaria, l'espansione militare o imperialista fuori controllo, la polarizzazione economica, l’ascesa della finanza a scapito dell’industria, e il debito eccessivo. È così anche per gli Stati Uniti odierni. Prima di esaminare i paralleli con l’America di oggi, gli scettici possono indicare come le varie cassandre di ogni nazione, prima che si scoprisse che avevano ragione, erano state premature nelle loro previsioni. Ad esempio in Gran Bretagna c’era chi temeva di fare la fine dell’Olanda già dagli anni 1860, l’apprensione poi tornò verso il 1890, basata sulla potenza industriale dei rivali tedeschi e statunitensi. Nel 1940 però queste previsioni si rivelarono esatte, ma in effetti le critiche iniziate nel 1860 e nel 1890 erano state premature. Anche gli Stati Uniti hanno avuto la loro dose di paure precoci. I decenni dopo le elezioni del 1968 furono segnati da nuove ondate nazionali di apprensione: che l’egemonia globale statunitense dopo la II Guerra Mondiale fosse in pericolo. La prima, nel 1968-72, è stata una miscela velenosa di crisi mondiale del mercato della valuta e la perdita del consenso della politica estera statunitense verso il sudest asiatico. Furono pubblicati libri dai titoli tipo “Fuga dall’Impero?”e “La fine dell’era americana”. Il disagio nazionale continuò con il caso Watergate e la caduta di Saigon. Il terzo stadio arrivò a fine anni ’80, quando un Giappone risorto sembrava sfidare la preminenza degli Stati Uniti nei campi della manifattura e perfino nella finanza. Nel 1991, l’aspirante alla presidenza, il democratico Paul Tsongas, osservò “la guerra fredda è finita, hanno vinto la Germania e il Giappone”. Beh, non proprio. Nel 2008 possiamo individuare un altro decennio rischioso: l’hi-tech mania del 1997-2000, trasformatasi nella bolla e nel crollo del mercato; l’attacco terrorista dell’11 settembre 2001; l’imperialismo arrogante e il pasticcio dell’amministrazione Bush con l’invasione dell’Iraq del 2003. A questo seguì l’OPEC che abbandonò il solito prezzo del petrolio di $22-$28, con il conseguente aumento del costo al barile a più di $100; il tracollo del rispetto mondiale per gli Stati Uniti a causa della guerra all’Iraq; l’implosione del mercato immobiliare domestico e la bolla del debito; e ancora la svalutazione di quasi il 50 per cento del dollaro USA contro l’euro dal 2002. E ci meravigliamo che tiri aria di crisi finanziaria globale?! Ecco la snervante probabilità: che una nuova, imminente crisi planetaria potrebbe fare del cinquantennio degli Stati Uniti tra il 1970 e il 2020 quello che il cinquantennio prima del 1950 fece alla Gran Bretagna. Questo sì che potrebbe essere il “big one”: il “fine partita” del pluridecennale dominio statunitense. La cronologia dei fatti ha un senso storico – quattro decenni di nervosismi prematuri seguiti da una realtà infelice. Il parallelo più agghiacciante con i fallimenti delle vecchie egemonie è la malsana dipendenza che gli Stati Uniti hanno avuto dal settore finanziario, usandolo come motore per la propria crescita. Nel XVIII secolo gli olandesi pensarono di poter rimpiazzare la loro industria in declino e il loro commercio con un grandioso schema di prestiti a principi e paesi stranieri. Ma una serie di tracolli e fallimenti bancari negli anni tra il 1760 e il 1770 minarono l’economia della nazione. All'inizio del 1900 un apprensivo ministro mise in discussione il fatto che la Gran Bretagna riuscisse a prosperare come “accumulatrice di investimenti” perché “i servizi bancari non creano la nostra prosperità, ma ne sono la creazione”. Verso la fine degli anni ’40, il carico di debiti causato da due guerre mondiali gli diede ragione, e il primato economico inglese sul mondo tramontò. Verso la metà degli anni ’90, negli Stati Uniti, tra i componenti del PIL, il settore finanziario superò la manifattura. Ma l’entusiasmo del mercato sembra aver bloccato ogni dibattito circa questo preoccupante cambiamento: negli anni ’70 la manifattura contava il 25% del PIL e i servizi finanziari soltanto il 12%, ma tra il 2003-2006 il settore arrivò al 20-21%, mentre la manifattura arrivò soltanto ad uno striminzito 12%. In negativo c’è che gli ultimi quattro o cinque punti di percentuale di espansione del PIL, prodotti dal settore finanziario negli anni ’90 e 2000, erano frutto di comportamenti azzardati o di aggiottaggio, come l’insolito incremento dei mutui ipotecari, la spericolato spinta ai prestiti sui titoli ed altre innovazioni che sarebbe stato meglio lasciar fare ai casinò. Il credito sfrenato agiva da lubrificante. Tra il 1987 e il 2007 il debito totale negli Stati Uniti balzò da circa 9mila miliardi di dollari a circa 30mila miliardi, con il debito del settore finanziario privato alla guida della grande abbuffata. Washington guardava benevolmente al settore finanziario negli anni ’80, elargendo un’infinita quantità di liquidi e coperture. Personaggi influenti come Greenspan, l’ex segretario al Tesoro Robert Rubin e l’attuale segretario, Henry Paulson, si rifiutarono ingiustificatamente di regolamentare l’industria. Tutti sembravano dare il benvenuto alle bolle azionarie; forse pensavano che l’industria finanziaria fosse il nuovo settore dominante nell’evoluzione economica, proprio come l’industria aveva rimpiazzato l’agricoltura sul finire del XIX secolo. Ma seriamente, chi si aspetta che la prossima potenza economica – Cina, India, Brasile – abbia un PIL dominato dal settore finanziario? A causa dell’espansione del settore finanziario, gli Stati Uniti del 2008 sono diventati i più grandi debitori del mondo, hanno di gran lunga il più grande deficit sui conti correnti e sono i più grandi importatori, con altissimi costi, sia di merci che di petrolio. Se il mondo subisse la più grande crisi finanziaria dal 1930, il danno potenziale è incalcolabile. La perdita della guida economica globale che subirono Gran Bretagna e Olanda sembra profilarsi minacciosamente al nostro orizzonte. Di Kevin Phillips il libro: “Denaro sporco: finanza spericolata, fallimento politico e la crisi globale del capitalismo americano”. 18 maggio 2008 Titolo originale: The Old Titans All Collapsed. Is the U.S. Next? Fonte: washingtonpost.com Link Tradotto per www.comedonchisciotte.org da GIANNI ELLENA
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  高度金融化：盛世之兆，还是盛极之衰象？

  http://luoning.mentor100.com/2008/06/03/%e9%ab%98%e5%ba%a6%e...
  51 days ago in 骆宁的blog · Authority: 2

  多次听到这种说法：金融发达的程度是一个国家发达程度的标志。还有许多更细致的指标，如人均GDP达到多少多少，在信贷、理财、投资等方面的支出就应该达到多少多少。 下面这篇文章的美国作者却认为，在大帝国盛极而衰的几项征兆中，高度金融化是最令他为美国未来忧虑的败相。是否同意这一看法，大家当然可以见仁见智，各抒己见。 中国经济目前金融化的程度到底高不高，是另一个值得讨论的话题。中国现在被称之为“世界工厂”，制造业的比重恐怕非常高。作为世界上最大的建筑工地，建筑业比重也不会低。可是如何与金融业规模比较，我从国家统计局网站的报表上半天也没看出个名堂来。不知哪位门友可以指点迷津？中国2007年底的储蓄超过40万亿，远远超过2007年GDP总量24.7万亿。不过中国储蓄率太高，这个指标不太有国际可比性。熟悉股市的门友也可以比较一下金融业与制造业市值的比例。还可以有很多其他的衡量金融化程度的指标。 (June 2, 2008) The Old Titans All Collapsed. Is the U.S. Next? By Kevin Phillips Washington Post, Sunday, May 18, 2008; B03 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/16/AR2008051603461.html Back in August, during the panic over mortgages, Alan Greenspan offered reassurance to an anxious public. The current turmoil, the former Federal Reserve Board chairman said, strongly resembled brief financial scares such as the Russian debt crisis of 1998 or the U.S. stock market crash of 1987. Not to worry. But in the background, one could hear the groans and feel the tremors as larger political and economic tectonic plates collided. Nine months later, Greenspan’s soothing analogies no longer wash. The U.S. economy faces unprecedented debt levels, soaring commodity prices and sliding home prices, to say nothing of a weak dollar. Despite the recent stabilization of the economy, some economists fear that the world will soon face the greatest financial crisis since the 1930s. That analogy is hardly a perfect fit; there’s almost no chance of another sequence like the Great Depression, where the stock market dove 80 percent, joblessness reached 25 percent, and the Great Plains became a dustbowl that forced hundreds of thousands of “Okies” to flee to California. But Americans should worry that the current unrest betokens the sort of global upheaval that upended previous leading world economic powers, most notably Britain. More than 80 percent of Americans now say that we are on the wrong track, but many if not most still believe that the history of other nations is irrelevant — that the United States is unique, chosen by God. So did all the previous world economic powers: Rome, Spain, the Netherlands (in the maritime glory days of the 17th century, when New York was New Amsterdam) and 19th-century Britain. Their early strength was also their later weakness, not unlike the United States since the 1980s. There is a considerable literature on these earlier illusions and declines. Reading it, one can argue that imperial Spain, maritime Holland and industrial Britain shared a half-dozen vulnerabilities as they peaked and declined: a sense of things no longer being on the right track, intolerant or missionary religion, military or imperial overreach, economic polarization, the rise of finance (displacing industry) and excessive debt. So too for today’s United States. Before we amplify the contemporary U.S. parallels, the skeptic can point out how doomsayers in each nation, while eventually correct, were also premature. In Britain, for example, doubters fretted about becoming another Holland as early as the 1860s, and apprehension surged again in the 1890s, based on the industrial muscle of such rivals as Germany and the United States. By the 1940s, those predictions had come true, but in practical terms, the critics of the 1860s and 1890s were too early. Premature fears have also dogged the United States. The decades after the 1968 election were marked by waves of a new national apprehension: that U.S. post-World War II global hegemony was in danger. The first, in 1968-72, involved a toxic mix of global trade and currency crises and the breakdown of the U.S. foreign policy consensus over Southeast Asia. Books emerged with titles such as “Retreat From Empire?” and “The End of the American Era.” More national malaise followed Watergate and the fall of Saigon. Stage three came in the late 1980s, when a resurgent Japan seemed to be challenging U.S. preeminence in manufacturing and possibly even finance. In 1991, Democratic presidential aspirant Paul Tsongas observed that “the Cold War is over. . . . Germany and Japan won.” Well, not quite. In 2008, we can mark another perilous decade: the tech mania of 1997-2000, morphing into a bubble and market crash; the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; imperial hubris and the Bush administration’s bungled 2003 invasion of Iraq. These were followed by OPEC’s abandoning its $22-$28 price range for oil, with the cost per barrel rising over five years to more than $100; the collapse of global respect for the United States over the Iraq war; the imploding U.S. housing market and debt bubble; and the almost 50 percent decline of the U.S. dollar against the euro since 2002. Small wonder a global financial crisis is in the air. Here, then, is the unnerving possibility: that another, imminent global crisis could make the half-century between the 1970s and the 2020s the equivalent for the United States of what the half-century before 1950 was for Britain. This may well be the Big One: the multi-decade endgame of U.S. ascendancy. The chronology makes historical sense — four decades of premature jitters segueing into unhappy reality. The most chilling parallel with the failures of the old powers is the United States’ unhealthy reliance on the financial sector as the engine of its growth. In the 18th century, the Dutch thought they could replace their declining industry and physical commerce with grand money-lending schemes to foreign nations and princes. But a series of crashes and bankruptcies in the 1760s and 1770s crippled Holland’s economy. In the early 1900s, one apprehensive minister argued that Britain could not thrive as a “hoarder of invested securities” because “banking is not the creator of our prosperity but the creation of it.” By the late 1940s, the debt loads of two world wars proved the point, and British global economic leadership became history. In the United States, the financial services sector passed manufacturing as a component of the GDP in the mid-1990s. But market enthusiasm seems to have blocked any debate over this worrying change: In the 1970s, manufacturing occupied 25 percent of GDP and financial services just 12 percent, but by 2003-06, finance enjoyed 20-21 percent, and manufacturing had shriveled to 12 percent. The downside is that the final four or five percentage points of financial-sector GDP expansion in the 1990s and 2000s involved mischief and self-dealing: the exotic mortgage boom, the reckless bundling of loans into securities and other innovations better left to casinos. Run-amok credit was the lubricant. Between 1987 and 2007, total debt in the United States jumped from $11 trillion to $48 trillion, and private financial-sector debt led the great binge. Washington looked kindly on the financial sector throughout the 1980s and 1990s, providing it with endless liquidity flows and bailouts. Inexcusably, movers and shakers such as Greenspan, former treasury secretary Robert Rubin and the current secretary, Henry Paulson, refused to regulate the industry. All seemed to welcome asset bubbles; they may have figured the finance industry to be the new dominant sector of economic evolution, much as industry had replaced agriculture in the late 19th century. But who seriously expects the next great economic power — China, India, Brazil — to have a GDP dominated by finance? With the help of the overgrown U.S. financial sector, the United States of 2008 is the world’s leading debtor, has by far the largest current-account deficit and is the leading importer, at great expense, of both manufactured goods and oil. The potential damage if the world soon undergoes the greatest financial crisis since the 1930s is incalculable. The loss of global economic leadership that overtook Britain and Holland seems to be looming on our own horizon. Kevin Phillips is the author, most recently, of “Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and the Global Crisis of American Capitalism.”
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  Short takes 05/24/08

  http://rightdemocrat.blogspot.com/2008/05/short-takes-052408...
  60 days ago in Right Democrat: A Mainstream Populist Voice · Authority: 21

  Honoring Our Veterans On Memorial Day http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/05/memorial_day.html A great Republican President's words stand in stark contrast to the modern day GOP http://patriot.net/~bmcgin/capitalismanddemocracy.html Stop Price Gouging by Big Oil http://action.citizen.org/campaign.jsp?campaign_KEY=5146 Kevin Phillips suggests that the days of the U.S. as a leading economic power may soon be over http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/16/AR2008051603461.html U.S. trade gap reduced by import slowdown not export boom http://americaneconomicalert.org/view_art.asp?Prod_ID=2993 Unemployment Compensation Extension Passes Senate, 75 to 22 http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/pm125 Hamilton Jordan: Architect of Carter Presidency dead at 63 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/20/AR2008052002286.html?hpid=topnews Baucus, administration debate trade enforcement http://www.billingsgazette.net/articles/2008/05/24/news/state/46-tradeenforcment.txt Nukes are the most climate friendly industrial-scale form of energy http://www.wired.com/science/planetearth/magazine/16-06/ff_heresies_08nuclear Big Tent to Get Bigger If Democrats Want to Expand House Majorityhttp://thehill.com/campaign-2008/big-tent-to-get-bigger-if-democrats-want-to-increase-house-majority-2008-05-22.html Jim Webb's Time To Fight http://news.yahoo.com/s/thenation/20080520/cm_thenation/7322265 Executive Pay Watch Database http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/paywatch/ceou/database.cfm Conservative Democrats in a strong position to win open Alabama seats http://blog.al.com/live/2008/05/gop_election_setbacks_could_sp.html Votes of working-class Democrats uncertain http://www.billingsgazette.net/articles/2008/05/20/news/local/23-obama_s.txt Webb would be bold choice for VP http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/20/AR2008052002346.html Young Voters Favor Activist Role by Government http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/05/progressive_generation.html Main Street Squeeze http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/3690/main_street_squeeze/ The Taxpayer Costs of Divorce and Unwed Child-Bearing http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/ec_div.pdf Turn Around America Video Contest - grassroots Americans submit their ideas to the AFL-CIO http://www.turnaroundvideocontest.com/steve_video.php SAVE Act gets another hearing, sort of http://www.statesman.com/blogs/content/shared-gen/blogs/austin/immigration/entries/2008/05/22/save_act_gets_another_hearing.html McCain defends 'Enron Loophole' http://atlanticfreepress.com/content/view/3951/32/ Unlike Bush-McCain, Obama Gets The Farm Bill Right http://news.yahoo.com/s/thenation/20080522/cm_thenation/1322762 How Sam Nunn Fit A Democratic Southern Strategy http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/shared-blogs/ajc/politicalinsider/entries/2008/05/22/how_nunn_could_fit_into_a_sout.html Musgrove Leads Wicker in Mississippi U.S. Senate Race http://www.musgroveforsenate.net/news/new_poll_shows_musgrove_leadin.html Florida Today: Our New G.I. Bill http://www.floridatoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080524/OPINION/805240313/1004&referrer=NEWSFRONTCAROUSEL New pro-life country song hits the airwaves (hat tip - Democrats for Life http://www.democratsforlife.org/)http://www.myspace.com/bluefieldband Economic Snapshot for May 2008 http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/05/econ_snapshot.html Al Shanker's Tough Liberalism - Interesting article about a labor leader who challenged political correctness on the Left http://www.forward.com/articles/13438/ Jim Webb on MSNBC's "Morning Joe" http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/shared-blogs/ajc/politicalinsider/entries/2008/05/21/jim_webb_on_the_coolness_of_wo.html Support for school vouchers is growing http://www.tampabay.com/news/education/k12/article510630.ece
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  The End of the US as World Colossus

  http://40yrs.blogspot.com/2008/05/end-of-us-as-world-colossu...
  61 days ago in 40 Years In The Desert · Authority: 16

  Kevin Phillips suggests that the United States may be facing a collapse of empire, as Holland did in the 1700s, and Britain did in the first half of the 1900s:There is a considerable literature on these earlier illusions and declines. Reading it, one can argue that imperial Spain, maritime Holland and industrial Britain shared a half-dozen vulnerabilities as they peaked and declined: a sense of things no longer being on the right track, intolerant or missionary religion, military or imperial overreach, economic polarization, the rise of finance (displacing industry) and excessive debt. So too for today's United States. ... The most chilling parallel with the failures of the old powers is the United States' unhealthy reliance on the financial sector as the engine of its growth. In the 18th century, the Dutch thought they could replace their declining industry and physical commerce with grand money-lending schemes to foreign nations and princes. But a series of crashes and bankruptcies in the 1760s and 1770s crippled Holland's economy. In the early 1900s, one apprehensive minister argued that Britain could not thrive as a "hoarder of invested securities" because "banking is not the creator of our prosperity but the creation of it." By the late 1940s, the debt loads of two world wars proved the point, and British global economic leadership became history.He then makes the caveat that the predictions of doom for Great Britain started well before any collapse, with peaks in such concerns in the 1860s and 1890s, when the collapse of empire was primarily a post 1918 phenomenon. It's a valid point, but we are operating on internet time, and the degree of leverage is further, and capital is far more mobile. He also notes that we have already experienced periods where the fall of America was predicted, in the early 1970s, and the early 1990s. I'm a bear, as I've repeatedly noted, and I've noted that a number of factors, particularly the rise of the Euro as an alternative reserve currency, make make it much more likely that the US will lose its status as the financial capitol of the world. Go read the whole article. It's only about 1200 words.
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  The Old Titans All Collapsed. Is the U.S. Next?

  http://business.NEWSKNOCK.INFO/stock-market-and-stock-prices...
  61 days ago in This Week’s Business and Finance News · Authority: 8

  The Old Titans All Collapsed. Is the U.S. Next? Back in August, during the panic over mortgages, Alan Greenspan offered reassurance to an anxious public. The current turmoil, the former Federal Reserve Board chairman said, strongly resembled brief financial scares such as the Russian debt crisis of 1998 or the U.S. stock market crash of 1987. Not to worry.
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  The Old Titans All Collapsed. Is the U.S. Next?

  http://farawave.com/other-source/173
  61 days ago in Fara Wave | Forex - Indexes - CFD - Futures - Metals & Elliott Wave Analysis · Authority: 4

  The Old Titans All Collapsed. Is the U.S. Next? Back in August, during the panic over mortgages, Alan Greenspan offered reassurance to an anxious public. The current turmoil, the former Federal Reserve Board chairman said, strongly resembled brief financial scares such as the Russian debt crisis of 1998 or the U.S. stock market crash of 1987. Not to worry. Summer may bring a turning point for stock market NEW YORK (AP) — After nine months of turmoil that started with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market, Wall Street appears to be at a turning point of sorts…. Stable market gives players a break Our players have held their positions over the last week and let a rising stock market add to their gains. Go to Original post
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  For U.S. Manufacturers, the Best is Yet to Come

  http://www.chamberpost.com/2008/05/for-us-manufact.html
  62 days ago in The ChamberPost · Authority: 101

  by John Murphy In his Outlook piece “The Old Titans All Collapsed. Is the U.S. Next?,” Kevin Phillips foresees the "multi-decade endgame of U.S. ascendancy" and ascribes it to America’s "unhealthy reliance on the financial sector as the engine of its growth" coupled with the supposed shriveling of U.S. manufacturing. He notes that in the 1970s, "manufacturing occupied 25 percent of GDP and financial services just 12 percent, but by 2003-06, finance enjoyed 20-21 percent, and manufacturing had shriveled to 12 percent." This selective use of statistics obscures more than it reveals about the health of U.S. manufacturing. According to the Federal Reserve, U.S. industrial production - 78% of which is manufacturing - rose by 57% between 1993 and 2007, a period when the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization brought new opportunities as well as new competition for U.S. manufacturers. This performance significantly outpaced the 28% increase in U.S. industrial production between 1981 and 1993. And contrary to popular perception, the United States remains the world’s largest manufacturer. The UN Industrial Development Organization reports that the U.S. share of world manufacturing output held steady at 21% from 1993 to 2005, during which time U.S. manufacturers set new records for output, revenues, profitability, and return on investment. By contrast, the Japanese and European shares of world manufacturing fell by about 3% each during this period. Bottom line, American manufacturers face challenges, but they continue to compete and win - just as the United States is doing.
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  The Old Titans All Collapsed. Is the U.S. Next?

  http://business.NEWSKNOCK.INFO/stock-market-and-stock-prices...
  62 days ago in This Week’s Business and Finance News · Authority: 8

  The Old Titans All Collapsed. Is the U.S. Next? Back in August, during the panic over mortgages, Alan Greenspan offered reassurance to an anxious public. The current turmoil, the former Federal Reserve Board chairman said, strongly resembled brief financial scares such as the Russian debt crisis of 1998 or the U.S. stock market crash of 1987. Not to worry. Summer may bring a turning point for stock market NEW YORK (AP) — After nine months of turmoil that started with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market, Wall Street appears to be at a turning point of sorts…. Stable market gives players a break Our players have held their positions over the last week and let a rising stock market add to their gains.

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